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UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONING AS
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Eithan Y. Kidron*
ABSTRACT
When should a regulator prefer criminal sanctions over administrative sanc-
tions? What procedural protections should apply if a process is labeled civil but the
sanctions are, in fact, criminal in type? And can the state justifiably conduct par-
allel proceedings for punitive sanctions against the same person or entity for the
same conduct?
Throughout the years, judges and scholars alike have tried to understand and
classify administrative sanctioning. Common to all of these conceptions is their
failure to provide a complete normative framework for this unique body of law,
which in turn makes it difficult to identify its practical limits and to resolve the
practical difficulties mentioned above.
This Article proposes a novel, normative paradigm for understanding adminis-
trative sanctioning. This Article suggests that an administrative violation is a
manifestation of an ex-ante excessive risk to public right. Based on the rationale of
corrective justice, administrative sanctions correct the excessive risk in the form of a
preventative sanction. Thus administrative sanctioning restores equality in the cor-
relative relations between the violator and the public right. The Article applies this
suggested approach to address some of the practical difficulties administrative sanc-
tioning raises.
INTRODUCTION
Administrative sanctioning is hardly new. Administrative sanc-
tioning developed as a separate body of sanctioning law alongside
the criminal and civil fields.1 Yet the state’s power to enforce and
impose sanctions do not fit into the customary paradigms of civil
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thank the members of Michigan Journal of Law Reform for their helpful comments and
suggestions. This Article has been made possible with the help of the Zvi Meitar Center for
Advanced Legal Studies scholarship.
1. Id. at 1813 (“The third arena of sanctioning law, punitive civil sanctions, developed
simultaneously with the criminal and civil paradigms.”).
313
314 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:2
and criminal law.2 Over the years, judges and scholars have tried to
characterize and distinguish this body of sanctioning law from
other bodies of sanctioning law, mainly criminal law. Their endeav-
ors can be classified into four conceptual paradigms of
administrative sanctioning.
The first paradigm rejects characterizing administrative sanction-
ing as a type of law. Instead, it conceptualizes administrative
sanctions as police power, as opposed to criminal sanctioning,
which it identifies as law. Markus Dubber, for example, has con-
tended that “[t]he project of ‘police law’ or for that matter of
‘administrative law’ in general” is not justice but, rather, prudence.3
In his view, criminal sanctioning is internal to law—its building
blocks are rights and it is engaged in remedying violations of auton-
omy. Police power, by contrast, is extraneous to the law—its
building blocks are efficiency and it is engaged in preventing risks
to welfare.4 Dubber builds on the claim he developed in his seminal
book The Police Power that “the distinction between law and police as
alternative modes of governance [is] best viewed in contradistinc-
tion to one another.”5
For those who regard administrative sanctioning as a body of law
as opposed to police power, the classification is usually divided into
either civil or criminal categories. Thus, the second paradigmatic
approach to administrative sanctioning characterizes it as civil law.
For example, when administrative sanctioning conflicts with crimi-
nal law principles as a violation of double jeopardy, the rationale
commonly given is that it is civil law.6 The Supreme Court consid-
ered the potential double jeopardy issue in two cases—one in the
1980s and one in the 1990s. Within these cases, the Court came to
opposite outcomes. In the first decision, United States v. Halper,7 the
court broadened the scope of the double jeopardy doctrine in cases
of parallel civil and criminal proceedings. In the second decision,
2. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1800 (1992).
3. Markus D. Dubber, Preventive Justice: The Quest for Principle, in PREVENTION AND THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 47, 64 (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds.,
2013).
4. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 104–17 (2005).
5. Dubber, Preventive Justice, supra note 3, at 49; see also Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner
& Patrick Tomlin, Introduction, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 1, 2–3
(Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013) (describing Dubber’s
argument).
6. The literature and case law on double jeopardy are vast. For an overview of the Fifth
Amendment from a historical perspective, see David S. Rudstein, Brief History of the Fifth
Amendment Guarantee against Double Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193 (2005).
7. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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Hudson v. United States,8 the Court overruled Halper and adopted a
narrower interpretation of double jeopardy protection.9 Common
to both decisions, however, was the use of the term “civil” to de-
scribe administrative sanctions, mirroring the legislator’s reference
to them as civil monetary penalties.10
The third approach sets administrative sanctioning in the crimi-
nal law rubric but distinguishes between two types of criminal law.
This distinction takes many shapes. Particularly familiar is the com-
mon law distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita.11 Another
well-known distinction is that made between core offenses and pe-
riphery offenses or, alternatively, between real crime and public
welfare offenses or regulatory offenses.12 Given the absence of some
8. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
9. See Marco Ventoruzzo, When Market Abuse Rules Violate Human Rights: Grande Stevens
v. Italy and the Different Approaches to Double Jeopardy in Europe and the US, 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 159 (2015).
10. See Charles R. Mills, W. Shaw McDermott, Andrew E. Porter & Kalun Lee, Litigating
Administrative Proceedings: The SEC’s Increasingly Important Enforcement Alternative, in KIRKPAT-
RICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS
AND STRATEGIES 323, 325–26 (Nicole A. Baker & Richard M. Phillips eds., 2d ed. 2007).
11. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1.6(a)–(b) (4th ed. 2003) (defining and dis-
cussing the difference between malum in se and malum prohibitum) .
12. See ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM 170–73 (2009) (discussing the distinc-
tion between real crime and public welfare offenses); William J. Stuntz, Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–15 (2001) (discussing the distinction between core
offenses and periphery offenses) (“Begin with the proposition that criminal law is not one
field but two. The first consists of a few core crimes, the sort that are used to compile the
FBI’s crime index—murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, arson, assault, kidnapping, bur-
glary, larceny, and auto theft. The second consists of everything else.”) (footnote omitted).
For further discussion on the distinction between core offenses and periphery offenses,
see Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 756 (2003) (arguing that in
the book, GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978), Fletcher “was the first to
suggest that the criminal law contains a core”). On the difference between the two types of
criminal law, see Klaus Gu¨nther, Responsibility to Protect and Preventive Justice, in PREVENTION
AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 69, 86 (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick
Tomlin eds., 2013) (“Criminal law is now characterized by an internal tension between a core
of protection of basic rights of civil citizenship by responsible subjects, and a penumbra of
offences which violate public interest and public safety standards. In the penumbra, negli-
gence and strict liability become the paradigm cases of legal responsibility.”).
Brudner reviews several different views of the distinction between real crimes and welfare,
or regulatory, offenses. BRUDNER, supra, at 170–71. One approach construes real offenses as
protecting the interests of individuals, while regulatory offenses protect the public interest as
a whole. Id. at 170; Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 83
(1933). A second approach holds that real offenses prohibit certain types of harmful behav-
ior per se, whereas regulatory offenses govern behavior that would otherwise be lawful, in the
interest of public health and safety. BRUDNER, supra, at 170; see R v. Beaver, [1957] S.C.R. 531,
539. Under a third approach, real offenses constitute “fundamental rules” that are vital to
society, whereas regulatory offenses constitute “non-fundamental rules” that are only helpful
to society. BRUDNER, supra, at 170; LAW REFORM COMM’N OF CAN., STUDIES IN STRICT LIABILITY
194 (1974). A fourth approach holds that real offenses typically impose sanctions to prevent
harmful behavior with zero benefit to society, while regulatory offenses “price” behavior that
generates both costs and benefits, so as to promote the socially optimal level of activity.
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of the important characteristics of criminal law (such as subjective
fault or retrospectivity), administrative violations cannot be, in their
essence, criminal law or, in other words, real crime under this ap-
proach. Nonetheless, administrative sanctioning resembles
punishment and is, therefore, located in the periphery of criminal
law.13
A fourth conception characterizes administrative sanctioning as a
middleground between criminal law and civil law. As Kenneth
Mann argued, “[t]hough attractive to the legal mind . . . the bifur-
cation of legal sanctions into two categories is misleading.”14 He
uses the term “middleground” to describe the hybrid jurispruden-
tial arena of punitive-civil sanctions. This hybrid draws on the two
basic paradigms of sanctioning law where “the sanction’s purpose is
punishment, but its procedure is drawn primarily from the civil
law.”15
Common to all of these conceptions is their failure to provide a
comprehensive normative framework for this unique body of sanc-
tioning law, which, in turn, makes it difficult to set its practical
limits. The first approach does not attribute any normative frame-
work to administrative sanctioning, leaving it virtually unrestricted
as police power.16 Under this approach, administrative sanctioning
is not law, and thus there are no internal constraints on its applica-
tion. As Dubber himself explains, “[f]rom the perspective of the
police power, ideas of justice and legitimacy have no purchase . . .
because the exercise of the police power is unconstrained by princi-
ples of any kind.”17
BRUDNER, supra, at 170; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 228 (6th ed. 2003);
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. LAW REV. 1523 (1984). Under a fifth ap-
proach, real offenses punish “stigmatic” violations, and regulatory offenses impose sanctions
for “non-stigmatic” violations. BRUDNER, supra, at 171; A. P. Simester, Is Strict Liability Always
Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 21, 23–24 (Andrew Simester ed., 2005).
13. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 169–70, 173–78.
14. Mann, supra note 2, at 1797.
15. Id. at 1799.
16. DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER, supra note 4, at xi–xv (arguing that the essential fea-
tures of police power reflect its origins in the (almost) limitless patriarchal power of the
householder over his household).
17. Ashworth, Zedner & Tomlin, supra note , at 3 (describing Dubber’s argument in
Dubber, Preventive Justice, supra note , at 64–65). Dubber admits that “the project of ‘police
law,’ or for that matter of ‘administrative law’” is limitless. Id. at 64.
Within the realm of police, there is no “principle”, and there is no “justice” (unless, of
course, one simply defines justice as police, with Bentham and Pound). There may be
maxims, guidelines, standards, recommendations, counsel, advice, and so on. But
there is no “principle”, if by principle we mean something like a norm that requires
compliance because of its normative significance, [that is], in politics (as opposed to
in morality, or ethics), because of its legitimatory significance.
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The second and third paradigms do not view administrative sanc-
tioning as having a complete normative framework of its own.
Rather, they attempt to attribute to administrative sanctioning an
existing framework, either civil or criminal. However, proponents
of both paradigms dismiss this framework for leading to uncertain-
ties and inconsistencies.
The tension between the Halper and Hudson rulings, and within
Halper itself, demonstrates the difficulty of sustaining the civil ap-
proach to administrative sanctioning. Many critics argue that this
approach leads to double jeopardy and a weakening of due process
rights.18 This stance recently found expression in the European
Court of Human Rights’ 2014 Grande Stevens v. Italy decision,19
which addressed the nature of administrative sanctions in the con-
text of insider trading and market manipulation. Marco Venterrozo
described this decision as follows:
In short, the Strasbourg Court held that the administrative
procedure followed by Consob—the Italian Securities and Ex-
change Commission—violates the due process requirements
of the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular
with respect to the separation between prosecution and adju-
dication and right to a full defense of the accused. In addition,
the ECHR concluded that the possibility to cumulate “adminis-
trative” pecuniary sanctions (or “civil penalties”) and criminal
sanctions is contrary to the prohibition against double jeop-
ardy, or ne bis in idem, also set forth by the European
Convention on Human Rights.20
Dubber, Preventive Justice, supra note 3, at 63.
18. See, e.g., Troy D. Cahill, Supreme Court’s Decision in Hudson v. United States: One Step
Up and Two Steps Back for Multiple Punishment Protection Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 464 (1998) (“[A]s government increasingly turns to punitive civil
sanctions to meet administrative and regulatory law objectives, multiple punishment protec-
tion must be applied in a manner to limit the increased threat of abuses by government.”);
Stanley E. Cox, Halper’s Continuing Double Jeopardy Implications: A Thorn by Any Other Name
Would Prick as Deep, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1235, 1238 (1995) (arguing that a defendant “cannot
twice be put in jeopardy of punishment for the same actions, regardless of whether the pun-
isher wears a civil or criminal hat”); Lisa Melenyzer, Double Jeopardy Protection from Civil
Sanctions after Hudson v. United States, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1007, 1042 (1998)
(“Those who believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect against re-
peated prosecution by the government believe that the Clause should provide protection
from the imposition of civil sanctions as well as criminal sanctions. Any other reading fails to
fully protect citizens from abuse of power by the government.”) (footnote omitted).
19. Final Judgment, Grande Stevens v. Italy, App. No. 18640/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-141794.
20. Ventoruzzo, supra note 9, at 146.
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It is no less difficult to sustain the criminal paradigm of adminis-
trative sanctioning. Alan Brudner argues that none of the criteria
for distinguishing between real crime and regulatory offenses suc-
ceeds in keeping the categories distinct.21 Petter Asp contends that
the central problem with the criminal approach is its lack of norma-
tive limits on preventative measures which characterizes
administrative enforcement:
The boundary of the deterrent threat, the end of the rehabili-
tation efforts is no more than the achievement of the result,
[that is] the realization of the preventive purpose; the limits of
prevention are empirical and are not determined by norma-
tive parameters. Unlike a criminal law response thought of as
retaliation—which has its own built-in limits, since a response
has to be adjusted to the thing which it is an answer to—pre-
vention has no antenna for excess.22
And indeed, a significant amount of scholarly work has criticized
the “grey line” between these two types of criminal law.23
The fourth approach is the only model that gives administrative
sanctioning its own unique normative framework. But it fails by at-
tempting to create an unnatural hybrid between the civil and
criminal frameworks. For example, Mann suggested that the deci-
sion as to whether to impose a sanction should be determined by
21. BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 171–72.
22. Petter Asp, Preventionism and Criminalization of Nonconsummate Offences, in PREVENTION
AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 23, 29 (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick
Tomlin eds., 2013) (roughly translating Winfried Hessemer, Strafrecht, Pra¨vention, Vergeltung,
7 ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 266, 270 (2006)); see also Frederick
Schauer, Ubiquity of Prevention, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 10 (An-
drew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013).
23. For discussions of the ambiguous boundaries of criminal law, see ANTHONY I. OGUS,
REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 79–81 (Hart Publ’g 2004) (1996) (sug-
gesting that the identification of criminal law with regulation is problematic, in part due to
the fact that most regulatory offenses do not require mens rea); Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambigu-
ity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 502 (2004)
(“[T]he question is whether the conduct engaged in was more or less acceptable behavior, at
least in the realm in which it was performed, and therefore, should not have been subject to
criminal sanctions in the first place.”) (footnote omitted); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observa-
tions on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,
425 (1963) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing some white-collar crimes from acceptable
aggressive business behavior); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of
Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 959 (2003) (“Compared to
other forms of criminal activity, white collar crime is famously written in shades of gray.”);
Marilyn E. Walsh & Donna D. Schram, The Victim of White-Collar Crime: Accuser or Accused?, in
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH 32, 36 (Gilbert Geis & Ezra Stotland eds., 1980)
(“[M]any frauds and larcenies by trick or false pretenses can be viewed as excesses in what is
normally accepted, aggressive salesmanship or shrewd economic behavior.”).
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the function of the sanction: “the more severe the sanction, the
more the procedure must protect against the sanctioning of the in-
nocent” and “the more it must protect the accused’s dignity and
privacy.”24 Yet as Coffee argues, this solution only further blurs the
boundaries between criminal and administrative sanctioning. Cof-
fee maintains that Mann’s proposition creates only procedural
limitations, rather than substantive limitations. While Mann “would
encourage less frequent resort to the criminal sanctioning by offer-
ing public enforcers the alternative of broadly overlapping
[administrative] penalties, this strategy does not ‘shrink’ the scope
of the criminal law, but only the frequency of its actual use.”25
What, then, is administrative sanctioning? If it is not a type of law,
then there are no internal limitations on its application. If it is law,
it is not clear which body of law—criminal, civil, or a hybrid of the
two—sets the normative limits on its application and if any of them
is even adequate for this purpose.
This is not just a theoretical question. The lack of clear norma-
tive boundaries on administrative sanctioning also impacts its
practical application. The growing debate on the boundaries and
distinctions between the different types of punitive enforcement fo-
rums in financial regulation exemplifies this problem. In that field,
the use of criminal sanctions is conventionally viewed as both unjust
and inefficient.26 The government, therefore, uses both administra-
tive and civil forums as alternative avenues for addressing criminal
violations of securities laws.27 But critics have recently suggested
that there is a fundamental difficulty in distinguishing between
24. Mann, supra note 2, at 1870.
25. John C. Coffee Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1877 (1991).
26. See Matthew Scott Morris, Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990: By Keeping up with the Joneses, the SEC’s Enforcement Arsenal Is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 151, 153–54 (1993) (arguing that Congress viewed criminal sanctions as an inappropriate
remedy for specific violations of the federal securities law, which often prevented the govern-
ment from seeking a remedy commensurate with the alleged violative conduct); see also
Ralph C. Ferrara, Thomas A. Ferrigno & David S. Darland, Hardball—The SEC’s New Arsenal of
Enforcement Weapons, 47 BUS. LAW. 33, 33 (1991). Morris argues that Congress viewed criminal
sanctions as an inefficient remedy and therefore not providing a sufficient level of deter-
rence. Morris, supra, at 153–54. Congress determined that “the risk of detection had
decreased and the potential for gain had increased.” Ferrara, Ferrigno & Darland, supra, at
33–35.
27. See Morris, supra note 26, at 153–54. Morris argues that the alternative punitive fo-
rums were meant to address both over-criminalization and under-enforcement: “[The 1990]
Passage of the Remedies Act embodied congressional desire to rectify two perceived deficien-
cies in the SEC’s enforcement program: lack of deterrence and insufficient flexibility to tailor
appropriate remedies to specific violations of the federal securities laws.” Id. (footnotes omit-
ted); see also Ferrara, Ferrigno & Darland, supra note , at 33; Mills, McDermott, Porter & Lee,
supra note 10, at 324–25.
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these forums. For example, Jed Rakoff, a U.S. district judge, has
sharply criticized the ambiguity that led to the failure to criminally
prosecute Wall Street executives for their role in the most recent
financial crisis and to instead settle for administrative punitive mea-
sures.28 Other critics have emphasized the concerns this ambiguity
raises regarding justice,29 legality,30 good faith,31 fairness, accounta-
bility,32 and the balance of power between the branches of
government.33 In addition, this lack of legal clarity has also led to
numerous constitutional challenges against the administrative fo-
rum. In the past few years, the constitutionality of the SEC’s
administrative proceedings has been contested regularly34 on
28. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/
financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/. Judge Rakoff wrote this article in the after-
math of the Citigroup and Bank of America cases. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y.2011), vacated and remanded, 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014); SEC v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). For further criticism, see Pub. Inv’rs
Arbitration Bar Ass’n v. SEC, 771 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
29. See Ann Lipton, What Hath Judge Rakoff Wrought?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Nov. 15, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/11/what-hath-judge-rakoff-
wrought.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_cam-
paign=feed:™ypepad/rMru+%28Business+Law+Prof+Blog%29. Lipton argues that “the SEC
(and federal prosecutors) prefer easy wins in insider trading cases to aggressive policing of
large financial institutions.” Id.
30. See William Shotzbarger, Business and Friendship Don’t Mix: The Government’s Expansion
of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC Rule 10b5-2, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 579, 599 (2014) (“There
are many policy concerns surrounding the SEC’s expansive ability to enforce its rules
through litigation. . . . These fundamental concerns [are] issues of legality, lack of notice,
and retroactivity . . . .”).
31. See LARRY DOYLE, IN BED WITH WALL STREET: THE CONSPIRACY CRIPPLING OUR GLOBAL
ECONOMY 181 (2014) (Doyle links the government’s failure to prosecute individual executives
of leading financial institutions for actions that precipitated the financial crisis, to an “addi-
tional lubricant that greased the wheels”). See generally id. at 167–82.
32. For the fairness and accountability critiques, see CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETI-
TIVENESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES
(2015), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_
SEC_Reform_FIN1.pdf; Peter J. Henning, New Criticism Over the SEC’s Use of In-House Judges,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/business/deal
book/new-criticism-over-the-secs-use-of-in-house-judges.html; Peter J. Henning, SEC Seeks
More Power, but Does It Need It?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 5, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/s-e-c-seeks-more-power-but-does-it-need-it; Peter J. Hen-
ning, The SEC’s Use of the “Rocket Docket” Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 25, 2014,
11:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/the-s-e-c-s-use-of-the-rocket-docket-is-
challenged.
33. See Dan M. Berkovitz, The Resurrection of CFTC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings:
Efficient Justice or a Biased Forum?, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Mar. 2015, at 10, https://
www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/
the-resurrection-of-cftc-administrative-enforcement-proceedings.pdf.
34. For further discussion, see Thomas Glassman, Ice Skating Up Hill: Constitutional Chal-
lenges to SEC Administrative Proceedings, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 47 (2015).
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grounds of violating due process rights,35 equal protection,36 jury
trial rights,37 separation of powers,38 and the non-delegation doc-
trine,39 amongst other things.
The lack of a normative framework that shapes coherent institu-
tions, procedures, and principles in administrative sanctioning are
the common ground of this criticism. Thus, the crucial questions
Mann raised some twenty-five years ago remain relevant: when
should a regulator prefer criminal sanctions over administrative
sanctions? What procedural protections should apply if a process is
labeled civil but the sanctions are, in fact, criminal in type? And can
35. Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 420, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In this case, the defend-
ants argued that the SEC had violated due process by depriving them of discovery and the
opportunity for a jury trial to decide the case, something that was afforded to others accused
of the same violations. Id. at 426–27. Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New
York refused to stop the administrative proceeding against Chau and Harding Advisory. Id. at
437; see Thomas K. Potter, A Renewed Fight Over SEC’s Admin Forum Constitutionality, LAW360
(Oct. 9, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/585756/a-renewed-fight-over-sec-
s-admin-forum-constitutionality; see also Jarkesy v. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2014),
aff’d, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Jarkesy accused the SEC of prejudging the matter by issuing
findings against other defendants that also implicated him, claiming that he could not re-
ceive a fair hearing before the Agency. Id. at 35. The District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected his request to stop the case because it found that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over his complaint. Id. at 40.
36. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Gupta’s complaint al-
leged that the SEC’s unjustified decision to deprive him, alone, of the opportunity to contest
the allegations in federal court singled him out for uniquely unfavorable treatment in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. Although the court held that his complaint was adequate
for exceptional judicial review, the parties subsequently settled, with the SEC dropping its
administrative claims and Gupta dropping his constitutional claims. Potter, supra note 35.
37. Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded, 825 F.3d
1236 (11th Cir. 2016). Hill argued that since the matter was brought as an administrative
proceeding, he was denied the opportunity to request a jury trial, thereby violating his Sev-
enth Amendment rights. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected this
argument.
38. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014). Justice Scalia challenged the SEC,
stating that “[w]ith deference to agency interpretations of statutory provisions to which crimi-
nal prohibitions are attached, federal administrators can in effect create (and uncreate) new
crimes at will, so long as they do not roam beyond ambiguities that the laws contain.” Id. at
353 (Scalia, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); see also Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1312
(N.D. Ga. 2015) (rejecting the argument that the Dodd-Frank Act was unconstitutional be-
cause it “delegates [decision-making] authority to the [SEC] to bring an administrative
proceeding for civil penalties against unregulated individuals”).
39. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1304–05. Hill argued that administrative proceedings violate
Article II of the Constitution because ALJs are protected by two layers of tenure protection.
Id. Moreover, he claimed, Congress’ delegation of authority to the SEC to pursue cases
before ALJs violates the Article I delegation doctrine. Id. On June 8, 2015, a federal district
judge issued a preliminary injunction, halting the administrative proceeding because it
found that the ALJ’s appointment is likely unconstitutional and in violation of the Appoint-
ments Clause. Id. at 1316–19. The SEC appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d
1236 (11th Cir. 2016) see also Duka v. SEC, No. 15-CV-3572015 WL 1943245, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 15, 2015).
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the state justifiably conduct parallel proceedings for punitive sanc-
tions against the same person or entity for the same conduct?40
Considering this background, this Article will propose an autono-
mous and unique normative paradigm for administrative
sanctioning, which sets the boundaries between the different puni-
tive enforcement frameworks. This Article begins by presenting a
paradigm of criminal sanctioning construed as core offenses and
then proposes a paradigm of administrative sanctioning based on
periphery offenses. To construct a framework for administrative
law, the Article takes a legal formalist approach and assumes an im-
manent, normative rationale to the law in general and to criminal
and administrative sanctioning in particular.41 Understanding the
immanent, normative rationality of these two bodies of law will clar-
ify the borderline between them.
This proposition may seem radical to those who reject outright
the conception of administrative sanctioning as law or, alternatively,
those who assert that it must be seen as law through the lens of a
contemporary functional approach. They may, therefore, regard a
formalist endeavor to identify administrative sanctioning as an au-
tonomous legal body as unorthodox. In addition, there are acute
implications to this proposal. It challenges practices that are today
taken for granted, such as the state’s authority to impose civil mon-
etary penalties and to conduct parallel proceedings for the purpose
of deterrence.
Yet as I suggested elsewhere,42 the ambiguity of the forum selec-
tion process does not stem from a lack of clear policy
considerations but rather from the functional legal theory behind
them, which has created systemic ambiguity in punitive forum selec-
tion. As a result of this ambiguity, not only can the regulated entity
not know in advance whether its conduct will be deemed criminal
or administrative in nature, but the regulator itself cannot provide
coherent justification for its forum selection decision.43 Further-
more, a clear, coherent paradigm can be constructed through legal
formalism that sets the necessary internal limits on administrative
enforcement. This paradigm will elucidate certain positive practices
that are common to administrative enforcement, as well as explain
the general unease with certain positive practices as due to their
inconsistency with the paradigm. This Article’s contribution is,
40. See Mann, supra note 2, at 1802.
41. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949, 950–57 (1988).
42. Eithan Y. Kidron, Systemic Forum Selection Ambiguity in Financial Regulation Enforcement,
53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 693 (2016).
43. Id. at 694–95.
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therefore, twofold. On the theoretical level, the Article presents a
comprehensive framework for understanding administrative sanc-
tioning. On the practical level, the Article applies this approach to
address some of the difficulties administrative enforcement raises.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the criminal of-
fense as reflecting the denial of the public right. Under this
approach, the rationale underlying criminal sanctioning is correc-
tive justice. That is to say, equality is restored in the correlative
relations between the offender and the public right, and this cor-
rection is legal and its viewpoint ex-post. Part II argues that an
administrative violation, in contrast to a criminal offense, repre-
sents the creation of an excessive risk to the public right.
Administrative sanctioning is also grounded on the rationale of cor-
rective justice. Here too the correction is legal, but in contrast to
criminal law, its perspective is ex-ante since it constitutes a preven-
tion of excessive risk created by the violator. Lastly, Part III
discusses the implications of the novel, normative paradigm the Ar-
ticle offers for administrative sanctioning. It considers the
conclusions that can be drawn from the Article’s discussion regard-
ing the choice between the criminal and administrative forums and
the ability to maneuver between them. Additionally, it considers the
theoretical challenge that monetary sanctions pose to the prevent-
ative justice approach in terms of their suitability to criminal and
administrative sanctioning.
I. CRIMINAL SANCTIONING
First and foremost, for the purposes of this Article, criminal sanc-
tioning must be understood from the perspective of legal
formalism. Legal formalism went underground during the second
half of the twentieth century and only recently reemerged. Formal-
ism is commonly held to maintain a separation between law and
politics. This depicts formalism as, at best, a pathetic attempt to
evade social responsibility and, at worst, a brutal camouflaging of
the reality of power relations.
Ernest Weinrib, one of the most eminent contemporary legal for-
malists, has argued that, to a large extent, this view stems from a
fundamental misunderstanding of legal formalism.44 Weinrib con-
tests current functional approaches, which understand law through
its purpose and focus on the goals it can attain. He argues that,
44. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 950–53.
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despite its popularity, this purposive understanding of law is a mis-
take because law should be understood inherently and not as the
legal embodiment of external goals. Weinrib contends that legal
formalism enables an understanding of law through law itself and
that it accommodates the possibility of an immanent, normative ra-
tionale to the law.45
Accordingly, per Weinrib, legal formalism has three foundational
principles. First, law has a unique rationale that is distinct from any
political justification. Second, this rationale has normative power.
Third, it is possible to understand and develop law from the inside
out. The rationality, normativity, and immanency that characterize
the formalist approach to law are interconnected.46
The internal perspective of legal formalism looks at the manifes-
tation of these three characteristics in criminal law. In line with this
approach, then, this Part will examine the relationship between
criminal law and the Kantian concept of right, the form justice
takes in criminal sanctioning, and the unique contents of criminal
law.
A. Public Rights and Criminal Sanctioning
The normative power of the different forms of justice stems from
the fact that they are based on the Kantian concept of right. This
concept constructs the intelligibility of legal relationships on the
notion of free action as required by the categorical imperative of
reason. According to Kant, ethical human beings must interact with
one another in a manner that is consistent with their equal status as
human beings: their actions, as actions of free beings, must facili-
tate the freedom of all others.47
To understand this connection between criminal sanctioning
and the Kantian concept of right, let us return to the distinction
between core and periphery offenses.48 Formalist tradition under-
stands criminal law as constituted by core offenses.49 According to
this tradition, the core of criminal law deals with the protection of
45. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1–8, 17–18 (1995); Weinrib, Legal For-
malism, supra note , at 950–57.
46. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 950–57.
47. See id. at 995–99, 997 n.100 (citing IMMANUAL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE 24 (John Ladd trans., 1st ed. 1965) (1797)).
48. See Stuntz, supra note 12, at 512–15; see also Husak, supra note 12, at 756 (arguing
that Fletcher “was the first to suggest that the criminal law contains a core. Unfortunately, he
does not explicate this claim in detail, but allows it to remain intuitive”).
49. See, e.g., BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 169–73 (calling core offenses “true crimes” as
opposed to “regulatory offences” or “welfare offences”).
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the agent’s rights (to life, physical integrity, property, and the legal
mechanisms that uphold and implement these rights).50 As op-
posed to private law, where a private right is harmed, in criminal
law it is the public right or, put differently, the principle of right
itself that is violated.51 The basic idea under this approach is that
private rights can only be exercised if they are publicly defended;52
they are meaningless in a world without public institutions that fa-
cilitate them or, in Kant’s terms, in the “state of nature.”53
Therefore, all free action is subject to the condition of what Kant
called “public right,” whereby public institutions pass laws that pro-
tect the rights of all54 The state, as the legal representative of the
public right, has an interest of its own: that its laws be upheld, sepa-
rate and distinct from the interest of a particular private party.
Whereas every individual has an interest in preventing or correcting
a violation of her rights, the state has an interest in preventing any
deviation from the state of public right to the state of nature. Crimi-
nal sanctioning, therefore, is a means of responding to violations
against the state as the formal representative of the public right.55
In other words, criminal law does not proscribe with infringements
of the private rights of an individual but, rather, with infringements
against the legal system that facilitates and protects the individual’s
rights.56 When the state punishes an offender, it is functioning as
the defender of the public order. To illustrate, an act of assault can
be construed differently on two parallel levels: in private law, it con-
stitutes a violation of the private right to the bodily integrity of an
individual; in criminal law, the same act is a violation of the public
right to the bodily integrity of all individuals.
There are two essential conditions to an infringement of the pub-
lic right. The first condition is that the perpetrator denied the
50. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 28–37. “The formal agency model of penal justice is
. . . organized around the familiar liberal idea: that the fundamental end of coercive author-
ity is to protect the agent’s liberty to pursue ends of its choosing insofar as it’s liberty is
compatible with an equal liberty of others.” Id. at 35.
51. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 31–33, 45–48.
52. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
145–47, 146 nn.1–3 (2009) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 338 (Peter Heath &
J.B. Schneewind eds., Peter Heath trans., 1997).
53. For elaboration on Kant’s state of nature, see RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM supra
note 52, at 145–147.
54. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 172–74, 173 n.58 (2012) (citing RIPSTEIN,
FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note , at 145).
55. See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 172–74.
56. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 45–48. Brudner relies on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right to
argue that “the point of punishing is to realize everyone’s right to act for any material end
against an intentional interloper’s denial of right.” Id. at 46.
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public right (the law) willfully.57 The identification of an act as an
offense indicates that the offender willingly removed himself from
the requirements of the public right. The state has no interest in
punishing an individual if his act was involuntary.58 In other words,
criminal intent is required, along with awareness of the act’s possi-
ble infringement of the public right. A denial of the public right
occurs in any one of the following circumstances: when the perpe-
trator interfered with the rights of another person, with the aim of
demonstrating the nonexistence of rights; when the perpetrator be-
lieves that the victim has no rights or that he or she belongs to a
group whose members have no rights; when the perpetrator con-
sciously risks infringing the rights of the victim; or when the
perpetrator commits an act that does not amount to a violation of
the victim’s right but does express the intent to violate that right.59
The second condition of an infringement of the public right is
that the offending act must be explicit.60 The desire to deny the
public right (the law) must be explicitly evident in the act, which
must manifest the actor’s criminal purpose to violate the order of
community life: “[n]eutral third-parties would be able to recognize
the activity as dangerous and harmful without knowing the actor’s
intention.”61 The criminal offense is, therefore, a willful and ex-
plicit denial of the public right.62
B. Criminal Sanctioning as Corrective Justice
Law is grounded on two different and discrete systems of logic.
Aristotle was the first to describe these two systems in his discussion
of the two forms of justice.63 The first form he identified is correc-
tive justice, which relates to the correlation between the wrongful
57. Husak, supra note 12, at 757 (attributing this argument to Fletcher). Husak argues
that “crimes in the core of the criminal law tend to conform to one of three distinct patterns
of liability.” Id. One of those patterns is “labeled subjective criminality. Intentions to violate a
protected interest are the essence of these crimes.” Id.
58. See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 172–74.
59. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 38–45.
60. Husak, supra note 12, at 757–58 (attributing this argument to Fletcher); see supra
note 57.
61. Id.
62. See id. Contrary to my argument, Husak says that Fletcher set a third condition,
which is harmful consequences. Id. at 757. “Liability is based on the objective attribution to a
responsible person of a harmful event that is conceptually independent of human action or
state of mind.” Id. Husak argues that the condition of harmful consequences has generated
considerable controversy. Id. at 758.
63. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 977 & n.57 (citing ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 115–23 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1st ed. 1962)).
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act and the suffering inflicted through that act.64 This is the struc-
ture of the bilateral relations between the doer and the sufferer of a
specific damage, like tortious or contractual damage. Corrective jus-
tice is manifested in law in the monetary amount that a particular
defendant must transfer to a particular plaintiff. Therefore, correc-
tive justice is expressed in terms of quantity.65 The second form of
justice is distributive justice.66 Here, the parties are not connected
as doer and sufferer of a particular damage but as human beings
who are subject to mutual benefits or burdens. In this relationship,
the task of the law is to distribute the benefits or burdens according
to specific criteria. The interaction between the two sides is de-
fined, not by what one did to the other, but in terms of the
reciprocal nature of the benefits or burdens and the entitlement or
obligation that derives from the criteria that allocate the benefits or
burdens. In other words, distributive justice is expressed in terms of
proportion.67 The law thus encompasses two forms of justice, each
with its own system of logic. Corrective justice is founded on the
logic of the relationship between doer and sufferer, while distribu-
tive justice is founded on the logic of the relationships between
people’s benefits or burdens.68
The normative force of these two forms of justice stems from
Kant’s concept of right, which governs the relationship between
free beings.69 Corrective justice assumes that parties bear a mutual
obligation to not interfere improperly with the rights of others.
When wrongful interference occurs, corrective justice ignores vari-
ables such as the wealth, power, and talents of the parties to the
interaction.70 The correction produced by corrective justice is the
reinstatement of the initial state of equality between the parties as
free beings. The monetary amount transferred from the defendant
to the plaintiff represents the extent of the violation of the initial
equality.71 Distributive justice is also grounded on the Kantian idea
of right. It mediates the relations between human beings through
an external goal, which is decided upon by the political authority,
64. See id. at 977–79.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 979.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1012 (“These two forms exhibit differing structures and are not reducible
one to the other. . . . Justifications that blend the components of these two different forms
are necessarily incoherent.”).
69. See WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 45, at 18–21; Weinrib, Legal Formal-
ism, supra note 41, at 995–99, 998 n.102 (citing IMMANUAL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OF JUSTICE 35 (John Ladd trans., 1st ed. 1965) (1797)).
70. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 980.
71. See id. at 995–99.
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and it requires that that political authority respect the rights of
human beings by the convergence into the internal structure of di-
vision, which justifies all divisions.72 Corrective justice and
distributive justice combine the normative relationships of ethical
human beings from a Kantian perspective and express this norma-
tivity through their unique structures of quantitative and
proportional equality. Hence, the two forms of justice have inher-
ent normative force because they presuppose the Kantian idea of
right.73
Criminal sanctioning follows the Aristotelian logic of corrective
justice. It restores the parties to the offense (the offender and vic-
tim) to the initial state of equality in which all individuals have
equal rights.74 In the context of criminal sanctioning, corrective jus-
tice is referred to as retributive justice. But there is disagreement
between formalistic thinkers regarding the character of retributive
justice as corrective justice. Brudner argues that while corrective
justice restores parties to the status quo ante, retributive justice sets
the offender back from the initial state of affairs to demonstrate its
validity.75 In other words, retributive justice is not satisfied with res-
titution and goes one step further by denying the offender his
freedom. Therefore, Brudner continues, “retributive justice is not
simply a form of corrective justice. It must be regarded as sui generis,
so that, pace Aristotle, there are three forms of justice, not two.”76
Weinrib, by contrast, asserts that the logic of criminal justice is
the logic of corrective justice. Weinrib argues that the logic of crim-
inal law is complex.77 To him, criminal law is not distributive justice
because “the norms on which criminal law insists seem to crystallize
conspicuous wrongs rather than to embody the proportionate dis-
tributions of benefits and burdens.”78 Weinrib thus argues that
criminal sanctioning falls under the rubric of corrective justice
since it presupposes the uniqueness of doing and suffering.79 In pri-
vate law, corrective justice means restoring the private parties to the
72. See id.
73. See id. at 999, 1012.
74. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 38–45.
75. See id. at 47 n.32.
76. See id.
77. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 982 n.73.
78. Id.
79. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 172–74; Weinrib, Legal Formalism,
supra note 41, at 982–83 n.73. see also Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 625, 700 (1991) (“I think it is fair to conclude that Aristotle’s elaboration of correc-
tive justice is consistent with, and indeed seems to have the same general contours as, our
current notions of just criminal and civil liability.”). For another perspective, see HERBERT
MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31–59 (1976) (arguing that criminal law disrupts the dis-
tribution of benefits and costs by taking unfair advantage of the system based on mutual
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status quo prior to the breach of the right. The restitution is not
factual. The wrongdoer cannot undo the physical damage caused to
the victim’s body, for example, but rather can only compensate her
for the damage she has suffered. Restitution is, therefore, a legal
and not a factual reality. Corrective justice, however, restores equal-
ity between the two parties by way of compensation.80  The
corrective logic holds in both criminal and private law, but there is
a fundamental difference between how the two operate. As ex-
plained, the criminal prohibition is not directed at the
infringement of another person’s private right but of the public
right. A criminal offender not only damages the victim but also de-
nies the general principle of rights, i.e., the law. The criminal
offender’s willful rejection of the rules of the social order consti-
tutes wrongful conduct that causes injury to the dignity and security
of each and every member of the state as well as to “the state
itself.”81
The correction of the injury to the law should, therefore, be in
direct proportion to the extent of the infringement.82 Applied in
the context of criminal sanctioning, the logic of corrective justice is
that equality is restored in the relationship between the offender
and the victim. The victim of a criminal act is a member of the state
(or the state itself), represented by the prosecutor, who, if success-
ful, obtains a remedy from the defendant through the bipolar
adjudicative remedial procedure. Here too, the correction is not
factual but legal.83 Rather than being eye-for-an-eye, retributive
punishment is a correlative legal response to the denial of public
right. Through proportional punishment, the law that has been vio-
lated reaffirms its binding force, and equality is restored.84
restraints). Duff compellingly criticized this position in R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS
205–17 (1986).
80. See WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 45, 114–44.
81. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 982–83 n.73; see Wright, supra note 79, at
639.
82. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 982–83 n.73; Wright, supra note 79, at
639.
83. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 982–83 n.73; Wright, supra note 79, at
639.
84. See, e.g., Shai Lavi, Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Duties of Citizens
and their Criminal Breach, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 783, 805, 807 (2011). Lavi suggests that citizen-
ship revocation is the proper retributive measure for certain political crimes:
The citizen who has breached the constitutional bond has violently attempted to un-
dermine the power of the community to self-govern. The proper punishment for such
an act would be to deny her the right of membership in the political community. . . .
[T]he will of the criminal to be exempted from the rules which apply to all is turned
against him. He who wishes to be excluded from the civil or political community is
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This may explain the discomfort some courts express with the
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ emphasis on the loss attrib-
uted to the defendant.85 Some judges have maintained that loss
serves different purposes in the civil and criminal contexts.86 More-
over, some district courts have begun to deviate from this focus on
loss in the Guidelines, especially where it results in disproportion-
ate and unreasonable sentences.87
The essential logic of corrective justice or, in other words, the
logic of retribution, underlies the criminal sanction. The term retri-
bution might be confusing. Contemporary theoretical thought on
criminal law tends to hold to a moral version of retributive justice,
viewing punishment as justified because it is the suffering that is
appropriate—or the appropriate condemnation in Antony Duff’s
words—for the prohibited behavior.88 Other moralists, such as
Michael Moore, treat the imposition of deserved suffering as intrin-
sically good and, therefore, requiring no additional justification.89
Duff, in contrast, regards the punishment of those who deserve it as
justified by another good—an internal reward, such as repen-
tance.90 Either way, moral retributivists believe that the inherent
good of punishing the morally guilty justifies the state’s use of
power to punish.91 With moral retribution, the penal law advances
the moral good of giving offenders what they deserve. The formalis-
tic theory of criminal punishment is termed legal retribution. It is
legal in the sense that it justifies state punishment as serving correc-
tive justice and the authority of law, as opposed to moral retributive
justice, which focuses on ensuring that the offender receives his
punished by being excluded from the civil society or the political community,
respectively.
Id.
85. See Derick R. Vollrath, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime
in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1036 (2010) (“The Sentencing Guidelines
pertaining to white-collar crime are deeply flawed. They recommend ranges that are gener-
ally too high, and are too narrowly focused on the loss calculation, an imprecise measure that
poorly approximates a defendant’s culpability.”).
86. See United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to adopt
civil methodologies because the policy rationale for civil remedies does not apply in the crim-
inal context and the civil approach is inconsistent with the principles of the guidelines).
87. See Vollrath, supra note 85, at 1012; Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar
Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 734 (2007); Lana L. Freeman, Note, Sentences
Should Be Reasonable, Not Shocking: A De-emphasis on Loss for Federal Securities Fraud Sentencing,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 969 (2012).
88. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 30 (2001).
89. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 87–91 (reprint.
2010) (1997).
90. See DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY, supra note 88, at 106–36.
91. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 19–20.
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due.92 With legal retribution and in contrast to moral retribution,
the penal code upholds the link between punishment and freedom
in the sense of respecting the individual’s immunity from being
compelled, or his right not to be compelled, to serve the goals of
others. With this right-based focus, legal retribution disconnects it-
self from the moral premise that the sole and sufficient reason for
punishing people is that they deserve it.93
C. Understanding Criminal Sanctioning from the Inside
The law can be understood from within. This internal viewpoint
looks to the form and content of the law. The form is a set of fea-
tures that constitute a given matter as identical to other matters of
the same type and distinguishable from matters of another type.
Form, while not autonomous of content, constitutes the totality of
features that identify content as predetermined and thereby iden-
tify the content as content. Form and content are, therefore,
inseparable and interrelated. Form is how we understand certain
content, and content is the manifestation of how we understand the
particular form.94
Legal form relates to the understanding of legal relationships.
Legal intelligibility derives from the mutual reciprocity between le-
gal content and legal form: form is the organizing idea embodied
in the content of law, and the supreme test of legal content is its
suitability to the form of justice it expresses.95 For example, private
law is characterized by the direct link between a particular plaintiff
and a particular defendant; the action of the plaintiff as directed
against the defendant; the process of judicial adjudication; the judi-
cial decision that reinforces retroactively the rights and obligations
of the parties; and the entitlement to relief or compensation for a
breach of a right or obligation. These are the contents of private
law that enable us to identify and understand it as such.96
The identification of a specific legal content is subject to its suita-
bility to one of the forms of justice.97  Judicial adjudication in
private law can be understood as the realization of corrective jus-
tice. The legislative ordering of the community can be understood
as the realization of distributive justice. These two forms of justice
92. See id. at 38–45.
93. See id.
94. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 958, 965–66, 1012.
95. See id. at 957–58, 974.
96. See WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 45, at 8–14.
97. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 982–85, 1012.
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are the most general conceptual patterns, and every fundamental
ideal of legal ordering must adapt to one of them for it to have
internal coherence.98 Coherence is, accordingly, a matter of match-
ing the content of the given body of law to one of the forms of
justice.99 Law authoritatively governs the relationships between peo-
ple, and justice is the intelligibility of this authority.  Intelligibility of
law, then, is the exposure of the relationship between the contents
of law and the forms of justice.100
Thus far, I have argued that the normativity of criminal law de-
rives from its protection of the public right; that the criminal
offense is constituted in a willful and explicit denial of the public
right; and that corrective justice is the underlying logic of criminal
law. I proceed to identify the unique, definitive content of criminal
law based on five of the features that constitute a matter as criminal
law: the definition of the wrong; the purpose of the sanction; the
type of sanction; the moving party; and the evidentiary rules. All of
these form the unique content of criminal law, which is distinguish-
able from the unique content of private law.
1. The Definition of the Wrong
Criminal law protects against the willful and explicit denial of the
public right. The explicitness and willfulness conditions to an in-
fringement are manifested in the content of the criminal law in the
requirements of actus reus and mens rea elements of the criminal
offense.
One of the criteria that traditionally distinguished criminal law
from private law is the definition of the behavior that generates re-
sponsibility.101 Generally speaking, in private law responsibility
arises from objectively explicitly negligent behavior without any
need for willfulness. In criminal law, however, responsibility arises
from conduct that must be accompanied by a subjective mental
state of willfulness.102 The negligent wrongdoer can breach the
equality of corrective justice simply by erring about what this equal-
ity entails. But this error does not negate the applicability of the
requirements of equality to his actions. A tortious wrong, therefore,
is a particular injustice to a particular victim, who can reestablish
equality through a compensation claim. As opposed to the tortious
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Mann, supra note 2, at 1805–06.
102. See id.
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wrongdoer, the criminal offender willfully inflicts damage and ex-
plicitly attributes to others in general the status of a mere means to
serve his own purposes. This is not only an injustice to some specific
victim but a general injustice to all people as equal human beings.
The mental element of the offense is, therefore, the expression in
positive law of the offender’s denial of the public right.103 Accord-
ingly, the mental element of mens rea is what distinguishes the
conduct governed by criminal law from that regulated by private
law.104
2. The Purpose of the Sanction
The purpose of the criminal sanction is to restore the public
right through legal retribution. The correction must be proportion-
ate to the injury and to the law. The punishment looks backwards at
the injury and corrects it accordingly. This is the application of the
principle of correlative justice in criminal sanctioning. It is how
criminal sanctioning ensures that justice is simultaneously done
both to the violated public right and the offender.105 The purpose
of the criminal sanction, then, is the restoration of rights that have
been denied by punishing the denier.
Deterrence, however, is also a purpose of punitive correction. Le-
gal formalism does not, in principle, accept deterrence as an
objective of punishment. From its perspective, the only relevant
question for determining criminal responsibility is whether the of-
fender committed the offense in question. The court looks back at
the crime that has already occurred and should be punished for; it
does not look forward to crimes that might occur and should be
deterred.106 Yet despite this apparent contradiction in principle, in-
tegration of deterrence as a goal of criminal punishment is
possible. Weinrib presents just such an option based on Kant’s
103. See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 172–74; Jules L. Coleman, On the
Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473, 474–78 (1974) (arguing that the standard
of negligence in tort law is an objective one that merely considers whether you have met the
specified standard of care (“legal fault”), rather than a subjective one that takes into account
your personal ability and efforts to meet the standard of care (“moral fault” or “blame”));
Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 982–83 n.73.
104. See Coleman, supra note 103, at 474–78 (arguing that criminal sanctions generally
are imposed regardless of actual damage and are scaled to the moral culpability of the wrong-
doer’s conduct).
105. See Weinrib, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 45, at 114–44.
106. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 635–37
(2002).
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treatment of the necessity defense.107 Weinrib argues that deter-
rence can be integrated into the consideration of the law’s
effectiveness.108 If the law has no potential for effectiveness, it is not
in fact law but, rather, a theory of rights. One component of effec-
tiveness of the law is deterrence, not in the utilitarian, forward-
looking sense of shaping behavior through incentives but in the
sense of preserving the validity of the law through deserved retribu-
tion. Through criminal punishment, therefore, the law that was
violated is effectively restored and its validity affirmed.109
3. The Type of Sanction
The meaning of the criminal sanction is the correction of the
denial of the public right by denying the offender’s right (his free-
dom). Since the late nineteenth century, imprisonment has been
the accepted means of denying an offender his freedom in the
West.110 The prison sentence in criminal sanctioning is the ac-
cepted equivalent to monetary compensation in private law. The
ability of the prison sentence to correct the injury to the public
right is similar to the ability of money to correct the damage to the
private right. In both cases, the correction is a legal reality, not a
physical one. A criminal offense represents the denial of the public
right, and criminal punishment represents the correction of the lat-
ter through the denial of the offender’s right. Retributive justice in
the form of imprisonment (or a fine) restores the parties to the
offense—the offender and the state—to the status quo ante, where
all individuals have equal rights. In this way, the law reaffirms its
own validity and that of the public right.111
107. Id at 634–38. Weinrib discusses Kant’s well-known example of two shipwrecked
sailors swimming for a plank that will support only one of them. Sailor A wins the race, but
Sailor B, who would otherwise die, takes the plank away from Sailor A, who then drowns.
Kant used this example to explain why Sailor B might be excused because in these circum-
stances, the law has no potential coercive threat over him. Id. at 634–35, 634 n.37 (citing
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 28 (Mary Gregor trans.,1991) (1797)); see also
BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 250–51; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW
165–66 (1999).
108. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, supra note 106, at 640.
109. See id. at 634–38.
110. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 14–16
(Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
111. See BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 38–45.
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4. The Moving Party
In private law, since the violated right is private, the moving party
is private as well. In contrast, in criminal law, the fundamental
equality of all is the violated right. The injury is general and in rela-
tion to the violated public right. Since the criminal offense is an
infringement of the public right, its correction in a criminal trial is
borne by the state, which is the official representative of the public
right.112  The state, through the apparatus of public prosecutors,
takes the leading role in the judicial proceedings that determine
guilt and, if necessary, punishment of the offender. State prosecu-
tion undoes the violation of equality by deploying a punitive
measure and restores the parties to their former status.113
5. Evidentiary Rules
Criminal sanctioning applies the high beyond a reasonable
doubt threshold of proof.114 This standard is not set high because
the state functions as the moving party in criminal proceedings, for
it can also be the plaintiff in civil proceedings. Nor is the severity of
the criminal sanction the reason for the high standard of proof. On
the one hand, civil proceedings can also culminate in a severe sanc-
tion, while on the other, criminal proceedings can certainly result
in a mild sanction such as probation or a fine.115 It is the need to
112. Wright, supra note 79, at 639.
113. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 982–83 n.73; WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE
JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 172–74.
114. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (under the Fifth Amendment due process
clause, the government must prove each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt).
115. See Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 L.Q. REV. 225, 234, 236
(2000). Ashworth argues that the functional distinction between criminal law and various
fields of civil law, including regulatory enforcement, is blurred. Id. at 236. He claims that “in
principle there might be instances where, dealing with essentially the same set of facts, a civil
court would award substantial damages when a criminal court might impose a relatively light
sentence on conviction.” Id. at 234. Further on, he suggests that “yet, again, this is not an
absolute distinction, since there are many criminal offences (especially strict liability crimes)
that carry such low penalties and low stigma as to have no greater social or professional
significance than an injunction or award of damages. Id. at 236; see also R.M. Brown, Adminis-
trative and Criminal Penalties in the Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Legislation, 30
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 691, 710–17 (1992); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Proce-
dural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 99–101 (2008) (also objecting to the assumptions in
relation both to the severity attributed to the criminal sanction and to the supposed leniency
of the civil sanction, including administrative sanctions). Brown argues that taking into ac-
count the probability and severity of punishment, in the enforcement of occupational health
and safety legislation in British Columbia and the United States, the average administrative
penalty is generally higher than the average criminal fine in Ontario: “Ontario’s advantage in
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uncover the subjective truth of a willful denial of the public right
that is at the essence of the stringent proof requirement in criminal
law.116 In private law, as noted, the mental element is measured ob-
jectively, and there is no need to show willfulness on the part of the
wrongdoer. All that is necessary is to be more persuasive than the
other party with regard to the objective truth. For this reason, a
party will generally prevail if he proves his case by a preponderance
of the evidence.117 It is my contention that criminal responsibility,
as opposed to civil responsibility, arises from a subjective, mental
element of willfulness on the part of the accused in denying the
public right, and significant evidence must be brought before the
court to prove this element.
To summarize, a criminal offense represents the denial of the
public right. Corrective justice is the rationale of criminal sanction-
ing, which means that equality is restored in the correlative
relations between the offender and the public right. The correction
is a legal act, as opposed to a factual or physical one, and the law
takes an ex-post perspective of the violation. Criminal punishment
eliminates the denial of the public right by denying the right of the
offender. Correction of the infringement of the public right is in
direct proportion to the infringement itself and is implemented in
the framework of the bilateral relationship between the offender
and the legal representative of the public right, i.e., the state. The
constitutive features of criminal sanctioning are an objective and
subjective denial of the public right, the purpose of ex-ante retribu-
tion, a sanction in the form of the denial of liberty (e.g.,
imprisonment or a fine), prosecution by the state, and the high
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.
[criminal] penalty severity is more than offset by the far greater certainty of [administrative]
punishment in the United States. Total penalties in the United States—the product of the
probability and severity of punishment—are many times higher than in Ontario.” Brown,
supra, at 710.
116. For a different approach, see Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 115, at 84. Rosen-Zvi &
Fisher propose to cut the Gordian knot tying substance to procedure and replace the current
bifurcated civil criminal procedural regime with a model that runs along two axes that are
more compatible with the actual goals of our justice system: the balance of power between
the parties and the severity of the sanction or remedy. Id.
117. For a deliberation of the burden of proof in private law, see Merzon v. Cty. of Suffolk,
767 F. Supp. 432, 444–45 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); see also James P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of
Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 245 (1944).
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONING
Understanding administrative sanctioning and distinguishing it
from criminal sanctioning is challenging because there is a lack of
deep theoretical inquiry on this body of law in contemporary legal
formalist scholarship. Legal formalism traditionally constructs its
conception of criminal sanctioning around core offenses. Here, I
will show that a similar conception of administrative sanctioning
can be based on periphery offenses. Regulatory offenses form a sig-
nificant proportion of periphery offenses. Historically, regulatory
inspectors were not entrusted with the power to sanction, but
rather that authority was left in the hands of the courts for constitu-
tional and political reasons.118 As a consequence, criminal
sanctioning was widely used for regulation enforcement.119 Thus,
political rather than legal considerations dictated the placement of
regulatory sanctioning in the penal code. A good starting point for
understanding the boundary between criminal and administrative
sanctioning, then, is the distinction between core offenses and pe-
riphery offenses.
Alan Brudner has attempted to construct a model to explain the
common law distinction between these two types of offenses and its
normative implications.120 In his view, a core offense proscribes in-
jury to autonomy or to the legal mechanisms designed to protect it.
Periphery offenses, in contrast, prevent injury to particular social
preferences (such as laws that promote free competition, transport
rules, parking regulations, and hunting and fishing rules) or injury
to public goods necessary for the realization of autonomy (such as
the regulation of the production of food, beverages, and
pharmaceuticals, environmental pollution regulations, and safety
regulations in transportation, industry, and aircraft).121 Brudner’s
distinction, in other words, focuses on the object of the injury: core
offenses violate autonomy or legal mechanisms that protect auton-
omy; periphery offenses risk the expression of that autonomy
through particular social preferences or public goods.
Brudner explains that deterrence is the rationale for sanctioning
periphery offenses. In his view, regulatory sanctions for periphery
118. See OGUS, REGULATION, supra note 23, at 79–81.
119. See id. at 81.
120. BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 171–73. Brudner uses the terms “true crime” and “wel-
fare offences” or “regulatory offences.” See, e.g., id. 169–73. Because he is referring to the
same kinds of things that the commonly-used concepts refer to, I use the latter.
121. Id. at 169–73.
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offenses are intended to prevent injury through deterrence of ex-
cessive risk-taking.122 Underlying regulatory sanctioning is not the
essential logic of retribution but the instrumental logic of means
and ends. Hence, retribution is irrelevant to regulatory sanctions;
they are defined as efficient or inefficient, rather than retributive or
non-retributive.123 Sanctions from which retribution has been ex-
tracted, argues Brudner, cannot be considered criminal.124 The
guiding principle of regulatory sanctions is not subject to rights-
based restrictions and is constrained only by the rationale of costs
and benefits analysis.125 Therefore, Brudner continues, if the policy
behind a given piece of regulation promotes the general welfare,
the coercive measures will be effective if they sustain that policy, on
the condition that the costs of the sanctions do not outweigh their
benefits.126 According to Brudner, this means that effectiveness can-
not come at the expense of autonomy. He thus holds that it is
wrong to infringe on a person’s liberty as punishment for a periph-
ery offense.127
There are two central problems with Brudner’s model. The first
is that his definition of periphery offenses limits them to injury to
public goods or social preferences, i.e., the object of the injury. But
his distinction between the two types of offenses collapses almost
immediately. Brudner himself clarifies that certain acts of injury to
public goods, if committed with subjective guilt, will constitute
criminal offenses. For example, he notes that a willful breach of
drug production regulations, which injures public health, could
amount to a criminal offense.128 Given this, Brudner refines his dis-
tinction, arguing that the crux of core offenses is willful
interference (or willful attempted interference) with autonomy,
whereas periphery offenses constitute an imposition of excessive
risk of interference with autonomy, regardless of the willfulness of
that interference.129 The main problem with Brudner’s formalistic
model of periphery offenses is that it is not, in fact, legal formalism.
He therefore takes the position that periphery offenses are external
to the law rather than internal to it; that they are grounded on effi-
ciency rather than on rights; and that they derive from policy needs
rather than legal considerations. Although supposedly presenting a
122. Id. at 176.
123. Id. at 176–77.
124. Id. at 177.
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id. at 178–79.
127. Id. at 179–84.
128. Id. at 172–73.
129. Id.
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formalism-based model of criminal law,130 Brudner abandons ad-
ministrative sanctioning to law and economics. As a result, the
jurisprudential coherence of sanctioning law is lost.
At this juncture, it is important to review the traditional formalist
conception of periphery offenses through which administrative
sanctioning can be understood. As mentioned earlier, the distinc-
tion between the two types of offenses in criminal law—core and
periphery—corresponds with the common law distinction between
mala in se and mala prohibita. Under this distinction, core offenses
are seen as ex post in nature, i.e., injury must occur before punish-
ment is imposed; periphery offenses, in contrast, are ex ante in
nature, i.e., they prevent injury before it occurs.131
The common law distinction is consistent with Dubber’s rich his-
torical description of the relationship between criminal law and
police power, first raised by the ancient Greeks. By Dubber’s ac-
count, criminal justice is a remedy for violated autonomy, whereas
police power is the prevention of injury to the public welfare.132
Anthony Ogus, who uses economic analysis terms, makes the same
fundamental distinction.133 He compares the effectiveness of crimi-
nal enforcement policy, which rests primarily on ex post deterrence,
to regulatory enforcement policy, which rests mainly on ex ante pre-
vention.134 The administrate state’s complex tangle of “public
welfare offen[ses]” and “regulatory offen[ses]” statutes expresses its
power to prevent injury by regulating—compared to punishing—
periphery expenses.135 This formulation has historical roots. Wil-
liam Novak has succinctly described the use of regulatory power in
the United States in the nineteenth century.136 This power, per No-
vak, was applied in line with common law tradition.137 Directed at
130. Although I am not sure that Brudner would agree with this definition.
131. BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 170. Brudner presents the common law distinction and
its criticism by such thinkers as Jeremy Bentham and Jerome Hall. See, e.g., JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 337–42 (1947); Jeremy Bentham, Essay on the Influence
of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171, 193 (John
Bowring ed., 1843).
132. See DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER, supra note 4, at 104–17; see also Ashworth, Zedner &
Tomlin, supra note 5, at 2–3 (interpreting Dubber as arguing that “the ideal of the Rechsstaat
or ‘law state’ must be set against the historical exercise of the police power, which, insofar as
it is concerned with the maintenance of peace and good order, is largely synonymous with
prevention”).
133. See ANTHONY OGUS, Criminal Law and Regulation, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
90, 90–94 (N. Garoupa ed., 2009).
134. Id.
135. BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 169.
136. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
137. Id. at 11–12.
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ensuring public welfare and public order, it was based on two com-
mon law legal institutions: public nuisance and overruling
necessity.138 The institution of public nuisance is grounded on the
goal of public order and permits the restriction of the liberty of the
general public. For example, to prevent fires, the public is prohib-
ited from keeping hazardous substances in their homes and
obligated to keep fire extinguishing equipment.139 The second insti-
tution overruling necessity derives from the preference for public
welfare over individual rights. It therefore allows, for example, the
destruction of private property in the attempt to prevent or stop a
fire.140
Thus, whereas core offenses were commonly used for ex post pun-
ishment for injury, periphery offenses were commonly used for ex
ante prevention of injury.141 We can draw from this basic distinction
the conclusion that has already been reached in relation to core
offenses: that injury in both types of criminal offenses is a violation
of the public right, as opposed to injury to a private right. But
whereas core offenses impose punishment only after a violation of
the public right has occurred, periphery offenses impose sanctions
to prevent a violation of the public right before it occurs. I would
like to develop this understanding from inside the law, while dis-
cussing the three fundamental features of law under legal
formalism and the relationship among them: rationality, normativ-
ity, and immanence. To illustrate the normative discussion, I will
present examples from the positive law. It is important to note that
I am not claiming that all or most of positive law manifests in the
same way but rather that examples can be found in positive law of
what I deem normative.
A. Public Rights and Administrative Sanctioning
I begin with the relationship between administrative violations
and the Kantian concept of rights. As discussed earlier, core of-
fenses manifest as a willful denial of the public right.142 This denial
138. See id. at 53, 60–62, 71–79.
139. See id. at 51–71.
140. See id. at 71–79.
141. See Schauer, supra note , at 11 (arguing that core offenses deal with retrospective
punishment for willful offenses and periphery offenses concern prospective prevention for
negligent or strict liability offenses and that in important ways, there is more ex-ante preven-
tion in the ordinary operation of the criminal law than is often acknowledged).
142. See supra Part I-A.
WINTER 2018] Understanding Administrative Sanctioning 341
of the public right is corrected in punishment, whereby the law con-
firms its binding force and the public right. In contrast, periphery
offenses manifest as the creation of an excessive risk to the public
right. This risk to the public right is corrected in prevention. In
both cases, the enforcement of the law protects the public right.
Recall that to facilitate the exercise of private rights, it is impera-
tive that they be publicly defended, including by way of legal
mechanisms that enable their existence and exercise. Private rights
have no meaning in the state of nature. It is therefore essential to
protect the status of the public right.143 The state has a duty to pre-
vent deviations from the state of public right to the state of nature.
This duty operates both retrospectively to correct past wrongdoings,
and prospectively in anticipation of unacceptable risks. Kant’s view-
point is not fixed solely in the past—i.e., on actions that have
already occurred—but also looks to the future.144 Indeed, the need
for a public law in itself reflects the prospectivity of law. Public law
was born out fear of injury, fear that a particular action does not
respect the freedom of all. It is thus necessary to subject everyone to
a public law regime in order to ensure, in advance, the protection
of equal freedom.145
The state must operate on two axes to protect the public right:
one through core offenses, which represent retrospective treatment
of injury that has already occurred; and the other through periph-
ery offenses, which represent prospective treatment of injury.
Although the injury is yet to occur, it has existing indications of its
potential. Take assault, for example, which we have already ana-
lyzed on two levels: private law, where it is a violation of the
individual victim’s private right to bodily integrity, and criminal law,
where it is a violation of the public right to the bodily integrity of all
individuals. But we can add a third layer to this analysis—the per-
spective of administrative sanctioning, where assault is indicative of
a future risk to the public right. Thus, the authority of a police of-
ficer with probable cause to detain or arrest a person he believes
has committed assault can be understood as a means of preventing
a future flight risk and a risk to the community.146
Why does the risk to the public right need to be excessive? As in
private law, in the context of administrative sanctioning, the state
has an interest in preventing only excessive risks. In the context of
143. See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 172–74.
144. See WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 45, at 108 & n.66 (citing IMMANUEL
KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 121 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
145. See id.
146. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 597 (2008).
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private law, George Fletcher advocates the common law notion of
reciprocity as the appropriate function of the tort sanction.147 This
viewpoint considers only the degree of risk imposed by the parties
on each other and the existence of possible excusing conditions.
This is in contrast to the notion of reasonableness, “which assigns
liability instrumentally on the basis of a utilitarian calculus.”148 The
general principle Fletcher expresses is that a victim in tort:
has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in
degree and different in order from those created by the victim
and imposed on the defendant—in short, for injuries resulting
from nonreciprocal risks. Cases of liability are those in which
the defendant generates a disproportionate, excessive risk of
harm, relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity.149
To illustrate, Fletcher compares the case of a pilot who subjects
those directly underneath the airplane’s flight path to nonrecipro-
cal risks of injury with the case of two pilots flying in the same
vicinity who subject each other to reciprocal risks of a mid-air colli-
sion.150 The same principle can be applied in the context of risks to
the public right. The state has no interest in intervening in regular
risks that people mutually impose on one another. This type of risk
does not pose a threat to the public right. Conversely, the state does
have an interest in intervening and regulating the behavior or activ-
ities of individuals that create non-regular excessive risks on others,
such as the risk that airplanes impose on the general public.
Financial regulation exemplifies this well. Securities legislation
protects the public right to property and the capital market is the
legal mechanism that enables the realization of this right to prop-
erty.151 Indeed, Congress indicated that the purpose of the
Securities Act of 1933:
147. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537
(1972) (detailing his argument in the abstract).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 542.
150. Id.
151. Regarding the purpose of the Securities legislation to protect the capital markets,
see generally Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Economies, Capital Markets, and Securities
Law 27–28 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 73, 2006), http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=908927. Prentice & Cross argue:
The basic goal of the 1933 and 1934 securities acts was to preserve and facilitate U.S.
capital markets. The key to that goal was to restore investor confidence in the markets.
The primary tools for restoring investor confidence were mandatory disclosure and
punishment for violations of those provisions, including failure to disclose and fraudu-
lent disclosure.
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is to protect the investing public . . . . The aim is to prevent
further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresenta-
tion; to place adequate and true information before the
investor; . . . to restore the confidence of the prospective inves-
tor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into
productive channels of industry and development capital
which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in
providing employment and restoring buying and consuming
power.152
The SEC similarly declared, in taking this role upon itself, that
“[t]he mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is
to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation.”153 The SEC intervenes and regu-
lates the behavior or activities of individuals that create non-regular
excessive risks on investors and on the market.
My proposed distinction between criminal offenses and adminis-
trative violations might need some clarification. Criminal offenses
can also relate to the creation of risks. For instance, shooting a gun
in a public place puts people’s lives at risk, and if the shooting was
willful, it is a criminal offense even if no one was hurt. This is a
criminal risk, for the focus is on the willfulness of the act and on the
past. Yet the fact that the shooting occurred in a public place gave
rise to a potential future risk, even if the shooting was uninten-
tional: there is some indication that the gun-owner was careless or
that the gun was malfunctioning. For this reason, the police might
detain the gun-owner or confiscate the gun. Here the focus is on
the risk and on the future.
Another question that might arise is what differentiates between
administrative violations and criminal attempts, assuming that the
former does not require the realization of the risk. My response is
that, whereas engaging in an explicit act to injure the public right
constitutes a criminal attempt, an administrative violation requires
Id. (citations omitted); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 925 (1994) (noting
that Congress believed when it passed the 1933 and 1934 acts that it “would benefit the
capital allocation process by instilling investor confidence in the banking industry and in the
securities markets”); Michael E. Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restrictions on Advertising
of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 41 BUS. LAW. 377 (1986) (noting that the main goals
of the 1933 Act were to restore market efficiency and prevent fraud).
152. S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933); see also Prentice & Cross, supra note 151, at 27–28.
153. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20171203025656/https://www.sec.gov/Arti
cle/whatwedo.html] (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
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only the manifestation of an excessive risk to the public right, with-
out any need for willfulness. To return to the shooting example,
this act could be interpreted as an, albeit failed, attempted murder
if the shooter demonstrated willfulness to murder. However, if the
shooting was unintentional, it constitutes only a threat to the public
right and, accordingly, an administrative violation.
Similarly, we may ask what differentiates between an administra-
tive violation and civil wrongdoing, assuming a lack of criminal
intent in the case of the former. In fact, some scholars contend that
a criminal offense that lacks criminal intent is necessarily a tort.154
However this is not necessarily true. Certainly, there may be circum-
stances in which an act can be interpreted as both an administrative
violation and a civil wrongdoing, as demonstrated in the assault ex-
ample above. Moreover, an infringement of a private right can have
a public dimension, thereby constituting it as an administrative vio-
lation. For example, a contractual right is a private right that can
also have a public dimension. This is Blackstone’s justification for
the application of “penal laws” (an early version of administrative
sanctions) in certain circumstances of breach of contract between
the individual citizen and the civic polity or the King.155 It is also the
justification for state or judicial intervention in contracts of adhe-
sion,156 where they might compel a redrafting of the contract ex-
ante or ex-post.157 However, not every risk to a private right has a
public dimension, and not every risk to a public right has a private
dimension. For example, there are thin-skull scenarios in which a
risk arises to a private right but not to the public right.158 Say a
person working in a tobacco processing plant was forced to leave
his job due to bronchial asthma that was allegedly caused by inhal-
ing large amounts of tobacco dust during his work. It is possible
that the tobacco company maintained reasonable working condi-
tions and that the amount of dust was not a danger to an ordinary
person’s health, but the company might still be required to com-
pensate the victim given the thin-skull rule. There may, however, be
154. See, e.g., BRUDNER, supra note 12, at 106 & 106 n.24.
155. 3WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *159 (“The party offending is here bound by
the fundamental contract of society to obey the directions of the legislature, and pay the
forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law requires.”); see Mann, supra note 2, at 1820–21,
1820–21 nn. 83–85 (quoting and discussing BLACKSTONE, supra).
156. For elaboration on the concept of contracts of adhesion, see Mo Zhang, Contractual
Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 137–38
(2008).
157. See id. at 139–42, 142 n.93 (describing ex-post judicial interference in contracts of
adhesion in cases of lack of real consent to the contractual terms; and also critics the lack of
ex-ante regulatory intervention in the form of various consumer protection laws).
158. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 464–65 (2000).
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cases in which two private actors decide to mutually put each other
at risk. Say, for instance, two men challenge each other to a car
race. According to Fletcher, if the one hits the other, the hit will
not constitute a tort. But it might nevertheless amount to an exces-
sive risk to the public right justifying state intervention in the form
of preventing the race.159
B. Administrative Sanctioning as Corrective Justice
Corrective justice is the rationale of the enforcement of both pe-
riphery and core offenses.160 In criminal law, corrective justice
means restoring equality in the relationship between the offender
and the law, and the restitution is effected through retribution.
Through proportional punishment, the violated law reaffirms its
binding force and restores equality. The same logic applies to ad-
ministrative sanctioning.
As noted, corrective justice relates to the structure of the bilateral
relations between the doer and the sufferer of a specific damage.
Corrective justice is the rationale on which administrative sanction-
ing is grounded, for it presupposes the uniqueness of action and
suffering and applies the principle of correlativity. However, in the
administrative sanctioning context, it is not damage that needs cor-
rection but excessive risk. The norm that administrative sanctioning
advances relates to the manifestation of an excessive risk to the pub-
lic right, not the allocation of benefits and burdens. It is structured
on the bilateral relations between the violator and the public right.
Administrative sanctioning thus falls under the category of correc-
tive justice since it is premised on the uniqueness of the bilateral
relations that characterize this type of justice.161
Corrective justice in administrative sanctioning means the resto-
ration of the initial state of affairs before to the manifestation of the
excessive risk to public right. Restitution is through prevention: cor-
rective justice prevents the excessive risk to the public right by
limiting the rights of the violator and thereby restores equality.162
159. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, supra note 147, at 542–43.
160. See Wright, supra note 79, at 640–41 (“Many . . . areas of public law, including much
of the legislative and administrative regulation of safety and pollution, are best understood as
prophylactic corrective justice . . . .”).
161. See id.
162. For the relationship between preventative power and risk, see Carol S. Steiker, Pro-
portionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
194, 196 (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013) (“[T]he proportion-
ality constraint on non-penal preventive policies, by definition, cannot be geared toward the
retributive metric of desert, but rather toward the metric of dangerousness. Thus, instead of
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The New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement
Act of 2013 (“SAFE Act”), a comprehensive gun control law, illus-
trates well how this operates. Among other things, the “Safe Act”
requires that medical care professionals report to the state the
names of patients whom they believe likely to engage in conduct
that would result in serious harm to self or others or, in other
words, manifest an excessive risk to the public rights of life and bod-
ily integrity. In these cases, the state has to intervene and to correct
the excessive risk. Therefore, those who are reported are disquali-
fied from owning or possessing a firearm for five years. If they have
a firearms license, it will be revoked. If they have a firearm, it must
be relinquished.163
Hence, the “Safe Act” restores the initial state of affairs prior to
the manifestation of the excessive risk to public right of life and
bodily integrity. Restitution is through prevention: corrective justice
prevents the excessive risk to the public right by limiting the rights
of the gun owner and thereby restores equality. Through adminis-
trative sanctioning, then, the state corrects the risk and protects the
public right to life and bodily integrity.
The correction of the risk must correlate with the extent of the
risk by applying the principle of proportionality.164 In other words,
the correction should not exceed what is required to eliminate the
specific risk. For example, an act of assault represents a high risk to
the public right to bodily integrity and, therefore, entails correction
in the form of freedom limitation.165 In contrast, although a driver’s
failure to give the right of way to pedestrians at a crosswalk indicates
a risk to the public right to bodily integrity, this risk can be pre-
vented by temporarily revoking his driver’s license, without any
need for further restrictions on his freedom.
The prevention of a future risk is consistent with corrective jus-
tice although the remedy against future violations applies when
there is still no violation to correct. Weinrib’s analysis of the struc-
ture of corrective justice addresses the unique form in which
focusing on degrees of offence severity and offender culpability, the proportionality inquiry
for preventive purposes must focus on the degree of harm sought to be averted and the
likelihood that the harm would occur in the absence of prevention.”) (footnote omitted).
163. James Jacobs & Zoe Fuhr, Preventing Dangerous Mentally Ill Individuals from Obtaining
and Retaining Guns: New York’s SAFE Act, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 78–79 (2016).
164. See Steiker, supra note 162, at 196. Carol Steiker argues that “those who have offered
various justificatory theories for nonpenal prevention generally agree, despite their differ-
ences, that proportionality should be considered a key constraining feature.” Id. at 195. For a
list of references, see id. at 195 n.3.
165. This, as noted, is what justifies the authority of the police to detain and arrest a
person reasonably suspected of committing assault. See CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note
146, at 597.
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remedy is the logical response to a violation.166 Corrective justice
relates to a narrow aspect of the wrongful act that connects the
doer and the sufferer. Every remedy that responds to responsibility
for a wrongful act by reflecting this structure is consistent with cor-
rective justice.167 Hence, in terms of corrective justice, the focus is
on the conceptual structure of the relationship between the of-
fender and the public right. The analysis does not require that the
violation was in fact carried out or that the remedy was awarded.168
His reasoning applies no less to an injunction that prevents damage
to a private right in civil law than it does to an injunction that pre-
vents injury to the public right in administrative sanctioning. Under
the logic of corrective justice, administrative sanctioning is con-
structed on the correlative relationship between the public right
and the violator’s duty to respect the public right. The preventive
remedy creates this structure by justifying the state’s right to take
action against the violation of the violator’s correlating duty. What
matters is not the temporal context of the violation and prevention
but the structure of the violation and the remedy that follows.169
To sum up, criminal sanctioning uses retribution to correct will-
ful infringement to the public right. Administrative sanctioning, in
contrast, uses prevention to correct an excessive risk to the public
right. Like criminal sanctioning, it is grounded on a corrective jus-
tice rationale: The correction of the risk (prevention) is in direct
proportion to the extent of the risk and is carried out in the frame-
work of the bilateral relationship between the risk and the legal
representative of the public right, i.e., the state.
C. Understanding Administrative Sanctioning from the Inside
This last section presents the unique content of administrative
sanctioning that constitutes it as such. I will briefly describe five
characteristics that identify a matter as administrative sanctioning:
the definition of the wrong; the purpose of the sanction; the type of
sanction; the moving party; and the evidentiary rules. Together,
these comprise the unique content of administrative sanctioning,
distinguishable from the unique content of criminal sanctioning.
166. See WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 45, at 144 n.41.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 56.
169. See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 172–74.
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1. The Definition of the Wrong
One feature that differentiates administrative violations from
criminal offenses is the definition of the behavior that gives rise to
responsibility. With a criminal offense, responsibility arises from be-
havior that is accompanied by a subjective mental state of, among
others, willfulness. With an administrative violation, in contrast, re-
sponsibility arises from a risk that is measured objectively, without
any need for a subjective mental state on the part of the violator.
Were a mental element of willfulness to exist in the act of creat-
ing the risk, this act would constitute a criminal offense. As
explained, criminal offenses relate to the infringement of the pub-
lic right and are intended to protect the public right. The
infringement of the public right is subjective, as the offender acts
with criminal intent when she denies the public right. Administra-
tive violations, on the other hand, relate to acts that subject the
public right to an objective risk. The offender does not subjectively
deny the public right, but rather objectively puts it at risk. Neverthe-
less, this behavior must still be prevented. For example, preventing
dangerous, mentally-ill individuals from obtaining guns is com-
pletely unrelated to a subjective mental state of willfulness, as some
of the mentally ill are understood to be insane and, therefore, inca-
pable of such a state of mind.170 However, some of the mentally ill
nonetheless create an objective risk to the public right that must be
prevented.
2. The Purpose of the Sanction
From the perspective of corrective justice, the purpose of admin-
istrative sanctions is to correct an excessive risk to the public right.
The correction must be directly proportion to the extent of the
risk. This is the manifestation of the principle of correlativity in ad-
ministrative sanctioning, maintaining a link between risk and
prevention.
When deciding on an administrative sanction for creating a risk,
both the degree of the risk and likelihood of its materialization are
important considerations, given the requirement for proportional-
ity between the sanction and the expected risk. Accordingly, when
there is a high expected risk of a violation of the public right, the
170. JOSHUA DRESSLER, BLACK LETTER OUTLINE ON CRIMINAL LAW, 181–85 (2015)
(Dressler discusses the Defense of “Insanity,” and distinguishes between the “mentally-ill” and
“the insane”).
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restriction on the liberty of the potential violator should be severe,
say, in the form of arrest. But when there is a low expected risk of a
violation of the public right, less severe restrictions, such as house
arrest, may be sufficient for preventing the risk from materializing.
3. The Type of Sanction
Criminal sanctioning denies freedom (through imprisonment
and fines), while administrative sanctioning restricts it (through ar-
rest, suspension or revocation of a license, barring from association,
etc.).171 Criminal punishment undoes the denial of the public’s
right by denying the right (freedom) of the offender in direct pro-
portion to the injury he caused to the public right. In contrast,
administrative sanctions prevent the manifestation of excessive risk
to the public right by restricting the right (freedom) of the poten-
tial violator in direct proportion to the risk. This is illustrated by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides, “[w]henever it
shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is
about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any
provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder . . . it
may in its discretion bring an action . . . to enjoin such acts or prac-
tices . . . .”172 Indeed, preventative injunctive relief was the primary
enforcement mechanism available to the SEC for a long time.173
There may be factual similarities between the criminal and ad-
ministrative sanctions. For example, imprisonment and arrest both
deprive freedom of movement. But there is a fundamental legal dif-
ference between them. The criminal sanction is set in relation to
the injury done to the public right and is, therefore, fixed in na-
ture. Thus, a criminal sentence is always predetermined by the
court and, in principle, will not change during the time that the
prisoner serves it. In contrast, the administrative sanction is relative
171. See Mills, McDermott, Porter & Lee, supra note 10, at 323–24.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (2012) (granting the courts
jurisdiction over violation of all rules). But see 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) (allowing the SEC to
obtain injunctions against those who aid and abet in the violation “of any rule or regula-
tion”). Administrative sanctions that the SEC can impose are as follows: censure; cease-and-
desist orders; accountings; disgorgement of ill-gotten gains; suspension or revocation of se-
curities licenses and registration of securities; barring from association with securities
industry firms; barring of lawyers and other professionals from appearing before the Com-
mission or serving as an officer or director of a public company; and civil monetary penalties.
Mills, McDermott, Porter & Lee, supra note 10, at 323–25.
173. Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 BUS.
LAW. 1087, 1098 (1992).
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to the expected risk, and therefore dynamic in nature.174 Conse-
quently, the extent and nature of the administrative sanction can
vary; it can be reduced to house arrest and be for longer or shorter
durations, depending on the extent of the expected risk.175
4. The Moving Party
As opposed to civil wrongs, with both criminal offenses and ad-
ministrative violations, the injury or risk affects the public right.
The state, as the legal representative of the public right, is therefore
the moving party in both types of proceedings, through public pros-
ecutors and a wide network of regulators.176
However, as Kenneth Mann has pointed out, the False Claims Act
of 1986 allows for qui tam actions.177 “The qui tam action authorizes
private parties to bring government enforcement proceedings in a
representative capacity. The private party sues in the name of the
United States and receives part of the money judgment that other-
wise would go to the government.”178 The private party, therefore,
acts as public prosecutor and the transfer of part of the judgment is
payment for his willingness to collect the necessary evidence and
move the legal issue. Another version of qui tam actions is the gov-
ernment’s encouragement of whistleblowers to expose corruption
in corporations in which they are employed by offering them finan-
cial incentives.179 But this procedure is the exception that proves
the rule. The qui tam prosecutor does not prosecute on her own
174. Steiker, supra note 162, at 196 (“[T]he proportionality constraint on non-penal pre-
ventive policies, by definition, cannot be geared toward the retributive metric of desert, but
rather toward the metric of dangerousness. Thus, instead of focusing on degrees of offence
severity and offender culpability, the proportionality inquiry for preventive purposes must
focus on the degree of harm sought to be averted and the likelihood that the harm would
occur in the absence of prevention.”) (footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 198 (“Because dangerousness is the product of both the gravity of the harm
sought to be prevented (such as the sexual assault of a child, or the commission or facilita-
tion of terrorist acts) and the probability that such harm would occur in the absence of
preventive intervention, the proportionality of a preventive intervention fluctuates with any
fluctuation in harm or probability.”).
176. For instance, the federal securities laws authorize the SEC to prosecute and impose
sanctions for securities law violations through a variety of types of administrative proceedings.
Mills, McDermott, Porter & Lee, supra note 10, at 323–24.
177. False Claims Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (codi-
fied as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012)).
178. Mann, supra note 2, at 1800 n.20.
179. See, e.g., DELOITTE FORENSIC CENT., WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE NEW RACE TO REPORT:
THE IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND 2010’S CHANGES TO US FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES (2010); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107 (2006); Douglas W. Baruch & Nancy N. Barr, The SEC’s
Whistleblower Program: What the SEC Has Learned from the False Claims Act about Avoiding
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private behalf but, rather on behalf of the public right. She receives
only a fair wage for her efforts to correct the risk to the public right
and no compensation for her personal damage.
5. Evidentiary Rules
Criminal procedure sets a high barrier for the imposition of a
criminal sanction. In administrative proceedings, by contrast, a
lower threshold suffices.180 The high standard of proof in criminal
sanctioning expresses the need to uncover the truth about a subjec-
tive denial of the public right. No such need exists in the process of
administrative sanctioning: the risk is objective, and all that is neces-
sary is to convince the court of its existence. Thus clear and
convincing evidence is sufficient in administrative proceedings.181
III. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL PARADIGMATIC DISTINCTIONS
To summarize, an administrative violation is a manifestation of
an excessive risk to the public right. Administrative sanctioning is
based on the rationale of corrective justice, meaning it restores
equality in the correlative relations between the violator and the
public right. The correction is legal not factual but, contrary to
criminal sanctioning, the legal viewpoint of the administrative cor-
rection is ex-ante. The correction is in the form of prevention of
the materialization of an excessive risk that stems from the violator;
it is applied in direct proportion to the risk and in the framework of
the bilateral relationship between the violator and the state. The
content that identifies administrative sanctioning as such is: the ob-
jective manifestation of an excessive risk to the public right; the
purpose of ex-ante prevention; a sanction in the form of restriction
of liberty; the state functioning as prosecutor; and the moderate
standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence.
The arrangement of the generic characteristics of sanctioning
systems sets the normative framework in which much of the juris-
prudence on sanctions develops. Table 1 below presents the key
Whistleblower Abuses, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2011); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Be-
yond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for
Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357 (2007) .
180. See Coffee Jr., supra note 25, at 1890–93.
181. See id.
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distinctive characteristics of criminal law and administrative
sanctioning.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SANCTIONING PARADIGMS
Body of Criminal Administrative
Law Sanctioning Sanctioning
excessive risk to public
Normativity denial of public right
right
Rationale corrective justice corrective justice
objective and subjective objective manifestation of
Definition of the Wrong infringement of public excessive risk to public
right right
Purpose of the Sanction ex-post retribution ex-ante prevention
denial of liberty (e.g., by limitation of liberty (e.g.,
Type of Sanction
imprisonment or fine) by injunction)
Moving Party the state the state
clear and convincing
Evidentiary Rules beyond reasonable doubt
evidence
B. Implications
To conclude the Article’s discussion, I will explore the implica-
tions of its novel paradigm of administrative sanctioning for three
issues: the boundaries between the criminal and administrative fo-
rums; the legitimacy of civil monetary sanctions; and the scope of
double jeopardy.
1. The Boundary between Forums
How should a regulator choose between the criminal and admin-
istrative forums in prosecuting cases? Both criminal and
administrative sanctioning protect the public right. In both, the
state acts as the legal representative of that right and protects it
based on the rationale of corrective justice. The criminal forum,
however, deals with ex-post subjective infringements, whereas the
administrative forum deals with ex-ante excessive risks. Therefore,
when a regulator has evidence of subjective fault on the part of an
offender, she should opt for the criminal forum. In cases in which
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there is evidence of a future excessive risk but no evidence of sub-
jective fault, she should choose the administrative forum. In other
words, the administrative forum should operate as a parallel, rather
than alternative, enforcement forum to the criminal forum. The
regulator may not use the administrative forum as an alternative
forum for criminal punishment.
The outcome of this normative position is that the possibility of
forum shopping is thwarted. The only consideration in the choice
of the criminal forum is the presence or absence of criminal intent;
the only consideration in the choice of the administrative forum is
the presence or absence of an excessive risk.
Critics may argue that this reintroduces the problems that ex-
isted prior to the establishment of civil and administrative
alternatives to the criminal forum. For if there is no effective alter-
native to the criminal forum, the phenomena of under-
enforcement and excessive punishment will reemerge. But a cor-
rect understanding of the proper forum categorization will result
primarily in just enforcement and in a reduction of the undesired
consequences of forum selection ambiguity. I say reduction and not
elimination because it would be naive to think that the problems
with forum selection will completely disappear. Indeed, it is impor-
tant to clarify that legal formalism does not purport to dispel
ambiguity in the sense of ex-ante uncertainty at the outset of each
case. However, its construction of coherent and systematic legal rea-
soning does dispel the ambiguity ex-post.182
Not only is the forum categorization under my model just, but it
also supports the effectiveness and fairness of enforcement. Once it
is clear that these are not alternative sanctioning tools and that all
enforcement tools have their own unique features, they can be used
effectively in parallel. For instance, a person may provide material,
non-public information about a publicly-traded company she works
at to another person. If the person who leaks the information be-
lieves that it is inside information and that the other person might
use it against the law, this transfer of information constitutes a crim-
inal offense and the person who leaked it should be punished. In
addition, the very transfer of the information creates an excessive
risk for investors and the market. This makes the action an adminis-
trative violation as well that must be prevented in the form of a
cease-and-desist order, license suspension or revocation, or arrest,
for example. The criminal and administrative forums can thus be
efficiently used in parallel, and this will be just so long as each fo-
rum understands its purpose and limitations.
182. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 41, at 1008–12.
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2. Civil Monetary Sanctions
What are the adequate procedural protections that should apply
if proceedings are labeled civil but the sanctions are criminal in
type? Civil monetary penalties pose a challenge to the preventative
justice paradigm, and further inquiry is necessary to explore this
issue in depth. I will try, in brief, to outline some guidelines for that
inquiry. A monetary sanction can accommodate criminal sanction-
ing since it is a negation of the offender’s right to property.
Proponents of the economic analysis of law would certainly claim
otherwise and argue that the financial penalty could deter others
from committing the same violation. However, its suitability to ad-
ministrative sanctioning can be questioned for it is not, prima facie, a
preventative tool. From the perspective of legal formalism imposing
a fine on someone to deter others amounts to instrumental use of
the individual violator as a means to an end rather than being a
goal in itself. Therefore, the procedural protections of the criminal
forum should apply.
Yet it may still be possible to justify monetary penalties in admin-
istrative sanctioning. One way would be to understand the purpose
of the penalty as reimbursement of enforcement costs, that is, the
costs the state incurs to provide special treatment to its citizens.
This reasoning appeared in Helvering v. Mitchell.183 When a person
creates an excessive risk to the public, the state is forced to take
protective measures to counter this risk, which cost money. Com-
mon sense dictates that if a person creates a risk to the public right,
it is certainly legitimate to require her participate in funding the
necessary protective measures. In these circumstances the adminis-
trative forum’s procedural protections should apply.
Another possibility is to allow an administrative forum to impose
a criminal penalty in cases of denial of the public right. Under this
approach, the administrative forum is not restricted to administra-
tive sanctioning but can accommodate civil and criminal
sanctioning as well. Thus, when the SEC imposes a monetary pen-
alty it is wearing its criminal sanctioning hat, due to the violator’s
willful infringement of the public right. In these circumstances, the
criminal forum’s procedural protections should apply.
183. 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938) (the purpose of the sanction is “to reimburse the govern-
ment for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s
fraud”).
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3. Double Jeopardy Claims
Is it legitimate for the state to conduct parallel proceedings for
punitive sanctions against the same person or entity for the same
conduct? Given the boundaries between the criminal and adminis-
trative forums I outlined in the Article, the parallel use of the two
enforcement tools does not give rise to double jeopardy. On the
contrary: it is inappropriate to constrain the state’s ability to maneu-
ver between the criminal and administrative forums. State
authorities should be allowed to make use of all the available tools,
in accordance with their purpose and depending on the circum-
stances of the matter at hand. However, in the current state of
affairs and so long as the administrative forum functions as an alter-
native to the criminal forum and can impose civil monetary
penalties, procedural limitations such as double jeopardy are cer-
tainly justified.
These specific examples demonstrate the helpfulness of the
novel normative paradigm for understanding administrative sanc-
tioning. This paradigm aims to provide a complete, normative
framework for this unique body. By using legal formalism’s view of
law in general and of criminal law in particular, this framework can
succeed where other frameworks had failed. Due to the coherence
between the two branches of law, criminal and administrative sanc-
tioning, the boundary between them is already clear, and practical
difficulties are easily resolved.
